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[1]  Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure regarding 
electronic discovery are expected to take effect on December 1, 2006.2  
These amendments are designed to alleviate the burden, expense and 
uncertainty that has resulted from the application of traditional discovery 
principles in the electronic age.3  These principles worked well in an era 
where discovery was primarily limited to the production of paper 
documentation, but have proved unworkable when applied to the 
discovery of electronic data, particularly in the “corporate world,”4 where 
even the most routine business discussions are captured in electronic 
format.5  That world has been burdened with broad obligations to preserve 
and produce vast amounts of arguably relevant electronic data.  Those 
                                                 
1 Mr. Nelson is the Chairman of Nelson, Levine, de Luca and Horst, LLC, a law firm 
with offices in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Ohio, New York, and London.  Mr. Rosenberg 
is an associate with the firm. 
2 See generally JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL 
CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (2005), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/ST09-2005.pdf [hereinafter JUDICIAL 
CONFERENCE REPORT]. 
3 See generally id., at App. C-18. 
4 See id. 
5 See David K. Isom, Electronic Discovery for Judges, 2005 FED. CTS. L. REV. 1, 1 
(2005). 
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responsibilities may include the imposition of significant costs on the 
corporate litigant.6 
 
[2]  Electronic discovery obligations are further complicated by the fact 
that much of the discovery is at once temporal and permanent.  For 
example, electronic mail messages are often of no long-term importance to 
employees, and are therefore deleted shortly after receipt and review.  
Nevertheless, in many cases these e-mails do not immediately disappear.  
Deleted data remains on a computer’s hard drive until the space on the 
drive is overwritten by newly generated files.7  It is possible to recover this 
data after deletion, although such efforts typically require the retention of 
a forensic computer professional.8  Similarly, deleted e-mails are quite 
often preserved on back-up tapes automatically generated by a business’ 
information technology system.  On a periodic basis, these tapes generate 
a “snapshot” of the business’ computer system for the purpose of disaster 
recovery in the event of a widespread loss of data.9  It therefore follows 
that these tapes may contain the only copies of otherwise deleted e-mails 
or files.  As these back-up tapes are typically not formatted to allow for 
the retrieval of separate files,10 retrieval of these files again will require a 
                                                 
6 See Sasha K. Danna, The Impact of Electronic Discovery on Privilege and the 
Applicability of the Federal Communications Privacy Act, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1683, 
1688–89 (2005) (“[c]onsidering that production of documents can be extremely time 
consuming and expensive particularly in the context of electronic discovery, discovery 
requests seeking electronic data are more likely to be unduly burdensome than those 
seeking paper documents”). 
7 See Brian Organ, Discoverability of Electronic Evidence, 2005 SYRACUSE SCI. & TECH. 
L. REP. 5 (2005). 
8 See, e.g., Alexander v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, 188 F.R.D. 111, 116–17 (D.D.C. 
1998) (discussing process of restoring deleted files). 
9 See Lisa M. Arent, Robert D. Brownstone & William A. Fenwick, Essay: Discovery 
Preserving, Requesting & Producing Electronic Infomration, 19 SANTA CLARA 
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH L.J. 131, 143–44 (2002). 
10 See Rowe Entertainment, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, 205 F.R.D. 421, 429 
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“[t]he data on  a back-up tape are not organized for retrieval of 
individual documents or files, but for wholesale, emergency uploading onto a computer 
system. Therefore, the organization of the data mirrors the computer’s structure, not the 
human records management structure, if there is one”) (citation omitted). 
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forensic computer professional, resulting in a significant expense to the 
corporate client.11 
 
[3]  Undeterred, plaintiffs routinely assert wide-ranging requests for 
electronic discovery.12  Either expressly or implicitly, these requests often 
incorporate demands for material from “inaccessible” sources such as 
those identified above, as well as numerous other sources of electronic 
data.  Indeed, even a simple request for “electronic records” may be 
reasonably interpreted to encompass a demand for “voice mail, e-mail, 
deleted e-mail, data files, program files, back-up files, archival tapes, 
temporary files, system history files, web site information in textual, 
graphical or audio format, web site files, cache files, ‘cookies’ and other 
electronically stored information.”13  These requests are often intended to 
accomplish little more than to raise the cost of defense in an attempt to 
compel settlement. 
 
[4]  These requests often set the stage for charges of spoliation.  Electronic 
data is routinely deleted from a business’ “active” computer system.  Even 
when the data is preserved on back-up tapes, these tapes are routinely 
deleted, typically through an automatic operation executed after the next 
back-up tape is generated; only the most recent tape will serve the purpose 
of restoring (as closely as possible) the data that was on the system at the 
time of the loss.14  The very nature of electronic data generated in the 
corporate world will compel the routine deletion of much of this data.  As 
set forth below, the current state of the law with regard to discovery could 
be argued to support charges of spoliation in such circumstances, even in 
the complete absence of any intent to destroy information relevant to 
litigation. 
                                                 
11 See Arent, Brownstone & Fenwick, supra note 9, at 148 (“[a]lthough the cost of back-
up tapes themselves is relatively small, the cost of restoring, reviewing, and extracting 
responsive information from back-up tapes can run into tens of thousands of dollars”). 
12 Indeed, courts have recognized as early as 1985 that “[c]omputers have become so 
commonplace that most court battles now involve discovery of some type of computer-
stored information.”  Bills v. Kennecott, 108 F.R.D. 459, 462 (D. Utah 1985). 
13 Thompson v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 219 F.R.D. 93, 96 (D. Md. 2003); see 
also Antioch Co. v. Scrapbook Borders, Inc., 210 F.R.D. 645, 652 (D. Minn. 2002) (“it is 
a well accepted proposition that deleted computer files, whether they be e-mails or 
otherwise, are discoverable”). 
14 See, e.g., Linnen v. A. H. Robins Co., No. 97-2307, 1999 WL 462015, at *9 n.7 (Mass. 
Super. June 16, 1999) (demonstrating the recycling of back-up tapes every three months). 
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[5]  This concern is heightened by the recognition of most courts that the 
duty of preservation does not simply attach when an action is filed, but 
commences whenever circumstances may place a litigant on reasonable 
notice of an action.15  As set forth below, today’s litigious culture creates 
the likelihood that many corporate activities will eventually be the subject 
of litigation, even if performed in the good faith belief that the activities 
are within the scope of the law.  Given this potential, many corporations 
are faced with the Hobson’s choice of either preserving vast quantities of 
electronic data without any indication that the data will ever be relevant to 
litigation or deleting such data while running the risk of potential 
spoliation sanctions. 
 
[6]  This article will explain how the development of case law has led to 
this potential, while also looking at the real-world implications that this 
has upon litigants in the corporate realm.  This article will also address 
why the pending amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
although very helpful, fail to thoroughly address the problem of spoliation.  
Finally, this article will suggest ways in which the law of spoliation may 
be modified to reflect the electronic discovery age and ensure that the 
benefits of preserving relevant evidence are carefully balanced against the 
burdens of limitless retention periods. 
 
I.  A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF SPOLIATION 
 
[7]  Spoliation is “[t]he intentional destruction, mutilation, alteration, or 
concealment of evidence, usu. a document.”16  Spoliation may result in a 
variety of sanctions, including the imposition of default judgment in the 
rare situation in which lesser sanctions would prove ineffective.17  
However, “the oldest and most venerable remedy” for the spoliation of 
evidence is the “adverse inference” instruction.18  When this instruction is 
                                                 
15 See infra note 24, at 216. 
16 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 1437 (8th ed. 2004). 
17 See, e.g., Advantacare Health Partners v. Access IV, No. C 03-04496 JF, 2004 WL 
1837997, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2004). 
18 Jonathan Judge, Comment, Reconsidering Spoliation: Common-Sense Alternatives to 
the Spoliation Tort, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 441, 444 (2001). 
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issued, the jury is permitted to infer that the destroyed evidence would 
have been favorable to the opposing side’s position.19 
 
[8]  In analyzing whether sanctions are appropriate for the spoliation of 
evidence, most courts focus upon the culpability of the conduct and the 
relevance of the destroyed evidence to the underlying litigation.  A 
number of jurisdictions have limited the application of an adverse 
inference instruction to cases in which litigants have intentionally 
suppressed or destroyed evidence.20  In addition to situations in which 
litigants have destroyed evidence with the purpose of preventing its 
disclosure, intentional conduct has also been deemed to include situations 
of “willful blindness,” in which a litigant is aware of the existence of 
discoverable information yet allows for its destruction.21 
 
[9]  A significant minority of jurisdictions has held that the negligent loss 
of evidence can support an adverse inference instruction.22  As a 
determination of negligence is necessarily dependent upon the facts of an 
individual case, there are few hard-and-fast rules to inform litigants on the 
type of conduct that may warrant spoliation sanctions under this 
standard.23  In recent years, however, a number of courts have held that 
negligent spoliation may result from the failure to modify established 
business practices in response to litigation.24  This issue presents perhaps 
the most significant concern for corporate litigants with regard to the 
potential spoliation of electronic discovery. 
 
                                                 
19 Id. 
20 See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Midcap, 893 A.2d 542, 550 (Del. 2006); Taylor 
Steel, Inc. v. Keeton, 417 F.3d 598, 607–08 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing Ohio law); Gribben v. 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 824 N.E.2d 349, 351 (Ind. 2005); Ward v. Consol. Rail Corp., 693 
N.W.2d 366, 371 (Mich. 2005). 
21 Rene Durrant, Spoliation of Discoverable Electronic Evidence, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 
1803, 1819 (2005).  
22 See, e.g., Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d 99, 108 (2d Cir. 
2002); MOSAID Techs. Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 348 F. Supp. 2d 332, 338 (D.N.J. 
2004); Thomas v. Isle of Capri Casino, 781 So. 2d 125, 134 (Miss. 2001); Mead v. Papa 
Razzi Rest., 840 A.2d 1103, 1109 (R.I. 2004). 
23 See Durrant, supra note 21, at 1817–18. 
24 See, e.g., Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, 220 F.R.D. 212, 221 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
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[10]  Most jurisdictions also condition spoliation sanctions upon the 
relevance of the destroyed evidence.25  Other jurisdictions condition 
sanctions not simply upon the relevance of the evidence, but the prejudice 
to the opposing party resulting from the destruction of the evidence.26 
Other jurisdictions have indicated that the willful or bad faith destruction 
of evidence will merit sanctions even in the absence of relevance or 
prejudice.27 
 
[11]  Of course, a finding of spoliation is necessarily contingent upon the 
determination that a litigant had the duty to preserve the documents in 
question.  In this regard, numerous courts have recognized the 
“fundamental principle of law” that the duty to preserve relevant evidence 
does not merely attach when a suit is filed, but rather when a party 
“reasonably anticipates litigation.”28 
 
II.  APPLICATION OF SPOLIATION PRINCIPLES TO ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY 
 
[12]  It should be no surprise that many of the recent cases pertaining to 
spoliation have concerned the destruction of otherwise discoverable 
electronic data.  Some of these cases have concerned matters in which the 
circumstances indicate intentional efforts to delete discoverable electronic 
data.29  The issues addressed in the majority of electronic discovery cases 
are far less clear.  Quite often, electronic discovery spoliation matters have 
concerned the impact of pending litigation (or the threat of same) on 
                                                 
25 See, e.g., MOSAID, 348 F. Supp. 2d at 336; Abraham v. Great W. Energy, LLC, 101 
P.3d 446, 455–56 (Wyo. 2004) (citations omitted); Bohlmann v. Printz, 96 P.3d 1155, 
1158 (Nev. 2004); Hodge v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 360 F.3d 446, 450 (4th Cir. 2004) 
(citations omitted); Mead, 840 A.2d at 1108 (citations omitted). 
26 See, e.g., Ellicott Mach. Corp. Int’l v. Jesco Constr. Corp., 199 F. Supp. 2d 290, 293 
(D. Md. 2002) (citations omitted); Bolling v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 930 F. 
Supp. 234, 237 (W.D.Va. 1996). 
27 See, e.g., Zubulake, 220 F.R.D. at 221. 
28 Tracy ex rel. Tracy v. Cottrell, 524 S.E.2d 879, 887 (W.Va. 1999); see also Silvestri v. 
Gen. Motors Corp., 271 F.3d 583, 591 (4th Cir. 2001); Perez-Velasco v. Suzuki Motor 
Co., 266 F. Supp. 2d 266, 268 (D.P.R. 2003) (citing Silvestri, 271 F.3d at 591); Baliotis 
v. McNeil, 870 F. Supp. 1285, 1290 (M.D. Pa. 1994) (citing Hirsch v. Gen. Motors 
Corp., 628 A.2d 1108, 1122 (N.J. Super. 1993)). 
29 See, e.g., Kucala Enters. v. Auto Wax Co., No. 02 C 1403, 2003 WL 21230605, at *8 
(N.D. Ill. May 27, 2003) (recommending sanctions in light of plaintiff’s use of a program 
known as “Evidence Eliminator” to delete electronic files after commencement of suit). 
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standard document retention policies.  As the United States Supreme 
Court has recently acknowledged, it is “not wrongful for a manager to 
instruct his employees to comply with a valid document retention policy 
under ordinary circumstances.”30  The question that has faced many courts 
is when and how these “ordinary circumstances” become the type of 
circumstances that should compel a litigant to modify a document 
retention policy in order to preserve documents.  In so doing, electronic 
discovery spoliation cases frequently challenge courts to attempt to strike 
a balance between the general duty to preserve discovery and the 
impracticality of preserving even a fraction of the vast amount of 
electronic data generated daily by a business of even moderate size.  
Given the need to perform such balancing tests, “[c]ourts have found it 
increasingly difficult to reconcile the unique nuances of electronic 
discovery with the existing federal rules.”31 
 
[13]  At first, courts addressing these issues tended to apply an expansive 
and arguably overbroad interpretation of these preservation obligations.  
For example, in Linnen v. A.H. Robins Co., a Massachusetts trial court 
approved an “adverse inference” sanction for a corporation’s failure to 
preserve back-up tapes containing electronic mail messages that were 
potentially relevant to the litigant’s claim.32  While the company had 
continued the routine destruction of such tapes despite a court order 
expressly mandating their preservation, the trial court also held the duty to 
preserve such tapes continued after the order had been vacated, based 
upon a discovery request served by the plaintiff defining the term 
“document” to include “any record or compilation of information of any 
kind or description, however made . . . or stored.”33  The plaintiff also 
sought “any documents in the form of computer memory or computer 
disk.”34  Despite the fact that the discovery request made no express 
request for information stored on back-up tapes or other forms of archival 
media, the Court concluded that “[t]he language of the document request 
makes it clear that the plaintiffs sought the production of items such as the 
                                                 
30 Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 696 (2005). 
31 See Durrant, supra note 21, at 1806. 
32 Linnen, 1999 WL 462015, at *11. 
33 Id. at *10 (citations omitted). 
34 Id.  
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system back-up tapes and, after receiving this request, the defendants had 
an obligation to preserve any such documents or materials.”35 
 
[14]  Linnen suggests that a plaintiff may impose potentially unreasonable 
preservation requests on a corporate defendant simply through the 
mechanism of a broad discovery request.  This analysis is also apparent in 
the case of Wiginton v. Ellis.36  In Wiginton, the United States District 
Court for the Northern District of Illinois held that an obligation to 
preserve relevant electronic mail messages and back-up tapes was 
triggered upon receipt of a letter by the plaintiff directing the corporate 
defendant to preserve a wide variety of relevant data (including back-up 
tapes).37  Noting that “a party must preserve evidence that it has notice is 
reasonably likely to be the subject of a discovery request even before a 
request is actually received,”38 the court held that the corporate defendant 
was required to perform a search of electronic data (including back-up 
tapes) for relevant material before deleting the information.39  The court 
observed that the fact that the electronic data was destroyed pursuant to 
routine document retention procedures was no excuse, observing that 
“once a party is on notice that specific relevant documents are scheduled 
to be destroyed according to a routine document retention policy, and the 
party does not act to prevent that destruction, at some point it has crossed 
the line between negligence and bad faith.”40  Accordingly, the court held 
that the litigant’s “complete failure to perform any search rises above the 
level of mere negligence” as well as its “willful blindness in the context of 
the facts surrounding the destruction of the documents” compelled the 
court’s conclusion “that the documents were destroyed in bad faith.”41  As 
some back-up tapes had been retained, the court denied the motion for 
sanctions with leave to renew the motion if relevant evidence was 
discovered on the tapes.42 
 
                                                 
35 Id. 
36 Wiginton v. Ellis, No. 02 C 6832, 2003 WL 22439865 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 27, 2003). 
37 Id. at *4.  
38 Id. 
39 Id. at *6. 
40 Id. at *7. 
41 Id. 
42 Wiginton, 2003 WL 22439865, at *8. 
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[15]  Other courts have favored more reasoned approaches to the 
preservation obligation.  For example, in Concord Boat Corp. v. 
Brunswick Corp., the United States District Court for the Eastern District 
of Arkansas held that while a corporate defendant was obliged to preserve 
all relevant electronic mail messages once the lawsuit had been filed, the 
defendant was under no such duty to preserve such messages prior to the 
institution of litigation, even if the messages were potentially relevant to 
future litigation.43  The court observed that “to hold that a corporation is 
under a duty to preserve all e-mail potentially relevant to any future 
litigation would be tantamount to holding that the corporation must 
preserve all e-mail,” since “most e-mails, excluding purely personal 
communications, could fall under the umbrella of ‘relevant to potential 
future litigation.’”44  Noting that “corporations [spend] enormous amounts 
of money to preserve business-related and financial data (the information 
that is really of the most value in determining the issues in this case), they 
should not be required to preserve every e-mail message at significant 
additional expense.”45  Furthermore, the court observed that corporate 
employees “are in no position to evaluate the potential relevance of a 
given e-mail to future litigation.”46  Employees therefore routinely discard 
electronic mail messages that could have potential relevance to future 
litigation.  The court held that it would be inappropriate “to sanction these 
individuals and their employers for such benign actions.”47  Consequently, 
the court declined to impose an adverse inference sanction on the 
defendants for the deletion of e-mail prior to litigation.48  
 
[16]  The court also declined to impose sanctions for the deletion of 
certain e-mail messages following the receipt of the complaint.49  Noting 
that “[i]mmediately upon receipt of the complaint,” the corporate 
defendant “took steps to apprise all relevant personnel of the obligation” 
to preserve materials relevant to the litigation and frequently reminded 
employees of the preservation obligation, the court held that “[t]he fact 
                                                 
43 Concord Boat Co. v. Brunswick Co., No. LR-C-95-781, 1997 WL 33352759, *5 (E.D. 
Ark. Aug. 29, 1997). 
44 Id. at *4. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. at *5. 
47 Id.  
48 Id. 
49 Concord, 1997 WL 33352759, at *8. 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology Volume XII, Issue 4 
 
10 
that [the corporation] allowed individual employees to use discretion 
whether to retain e-mail is simply not indicative of bad faith” and 
therefore did not warrant an adverse inference instruction.50 
 
[17]  As illustrated by Concord Boat, an analysis of whether sanctions 
should be imposed for the destruction of documents often focuses upon 
the steps taken by a corporate defendant to communicate a preservation 
obligation to its employees.  For example, in Keir v. UnumProvident 
Corp., a corporate defendant was criticized for failing to clearly 
communicate the specific obligations created by a preservation order to 
information technology staff and an outside vendor, which resulted in the 
failure to create several back-up tapes required by the preservation order.51  
Similarly in United States v. Koch Industries, a corporate defendant was 
criticized for senior management’s negligence in “failing to determine 
which [back-up] tapes in the tape library contained information relevant to 
imminent and ongoing litigation and in failing to communicate clear 
guidelines regarding the preservation of information related to imminent 
and ongoing litigation to [the defendant’s] data processing personnel and 
computer tape librarian.”52  The court observed that the corporation’s 
negligence created “an environment that led to the destruction by 
computer personnel of computer tapes that should have been preserved as 
evidence potentially relevant to imminent or ongoing litigation.”53  While 
holding that the imposition of an adverse inference sanction was 
inappropriate, as the destruction of the tapes was not in bad faith, the court 
did allow the plaintiffs to “[inform] the jury as to which relevant computer 
tapes were destroyed and the impact that the destruction has had on 
Plaintiffs’ proof.”54 
 
[18]  In GFTM, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., sanctions were imposed on 
the corporate defendant for counsel’s misrepresentation of its ability to 
retrieve certain data.55  By the time it was determined that the defendant 
                                                 
50 Id. at *6. 
51 Keir v. UnumProvident Corp., No. 02 Civ. 8781 (DLC), 2003 WL 21997747, *7–8 
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2003). 
52 United States v. Kock Industries., 197 F.R.D. 463, 486 (N.D. Okla. 1998). 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 GMTF, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 98 CIV. 7724 RPP., 2000 WL 335558, *2-3 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2000). 
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could retrieve data from the past 12 months (rather than the five weeks 
originally claimed), over a year had passed, resulting in the permanent loss 
of a substantial amount of data.56  Although counsel’s original 
representations were in good faith and based upon the assertions of a 
corporate executive, the court faulted counsel for not communicating with 
IT personnel that would have provided accurate information at the outset 
regarding the capacities of the corporation’s computer systems.57  
Accordingly, the court ordered the defendant to pay attorney’s fees and 
costs resulting from the misrepresentation.58 
 
[19]  Sanctions for failure to effectively communicate a preservation 
obligation have not been limited to corporate defendants.  Applying a 
standard that “good faith” requires parties to take all reasonable steps to 
comply with a court’s order, in Landmark Legal Foundation v. 
Environmental Protection Agency, the United States District Court for the 
District of Columbia imposed a contempt sanction on the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) for failing to take reasonable steps to prevent 
the reformatting of hard drives and erasure of back-up tapes in violation of 
an injunction mandating the preservation of such data.59  The court faulted 
the EPA for limiting its efforts to preserve the data to the distribution of a 
single electronic mail message notifying employees of the injunction, 
which was sent a full week after the injunction was entered and was not 
sent to information technology personnel responsible for the maintenance 
of the tapes.60 
 
[20]  As is suggested by Concord Boat, a company that provides proper 
notification to its employees of a preservation obligation and takes steps to 
ensure that the obligation is carried out may receive some protection from 
sanctions, even if employees delete some documents.61 However, the 
decision of United States. v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., demonstrates that 
the mere implementation of document retention procedures is often 
insufficient to avoid sanctions. 62  In Philip Morris, the cigarette 
                                                 
56 Id. at *2.  
57 Id.  
58 Id. at *3. 
59 Landmark Legal Found. v. EPA, 272 F. Supp.2d 70, 73, 79 (D.D.C. 2003). 
60 Id. at 78–79. 
61 Concord, 1997 WL 33352759, at *8. 
62 United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 327 F. Supp.2d 21 (D.D.C. 2004). 
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manufacturer was fined over two million dollars for the destruction of 
electronic mail messages following the entry of a preservation order, 
which resulted in large part from the failure of employees to follow the 
company’s own internal document retention procedures.63  Emphasizing 
Philip Morris’ status as a sophisticated corporate defendant that has been 
involved in many lawsuits, as well as the fact that many high ranking 
executives failed to follow the retention procedures, the court condemned 
Philip Morris for its “reckless disregard and gross indifference . . . toward 
[its] discovery and document preservation obligations.”64  In addition to 
imposing monetary sanctions, the court also precluded Philip Morris from 
offering the testimony of any employee who had violated the company’s 
document retention procedures.65 
 
[21]  As illustrated by the cases set forth above, many courts have not 
been hesitant to impose severe sanctions on corporate defendants for the 
destruction of electronic discovery, even when the loss of discovery is 
clearly the result of carelessness rather than a desire to hide the truth.  Yet, 
most of these decisions have been fact-specific and focused upon the 
obligation to preserve electronic discovery after the entry of a preservation 
order.  Relatively few courts have analyzed the obligation to preserve 
electronic discovery in the absence of an order and even fewer courts have 
attempted to promulgate broadly applicable standards to guide 
corporations regarding the specific nature of their responsibilities to 
preserve electronic discovery, due to the impracticalities of preserving all 
electronic data with even a slim possibility of relevance.   
 
[22]  However, in the fourth of a series of at least seven opinions for the 
case of Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC,66 Judge Scheindlin of the United 
States District Court for the Southern District of New York provided 
helpful guidance as to the extent of a corporate defendant’s electronic 
discovery preservation obligations, regardless of whether a specific order 
has been imposed.67  The Zubulake cases concern an employment 
discrimination dispute in which several employees deleted electronic mail 
                                                 
63 Id. at 23, 26. 
64 Id. at 26. 
65 Id. 
66 Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) [hereinafter 
Zubulake IV]. 
67 See id. at 216–22. 
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messages despite instructions from both in-house and outside counsel to 
preserve the messages.68  While providing these instructions to numerous 
employees, counsel failed to take steps to preserve back-up tapes until 
such tapes were expressly referenced in one of plaintiff’s discovery 
requests.69 
 
[23]  Zubulake IV focused upon the scope of a corporate defendant’s duty 
to preserve.  The court’s analysis began by noting that this duty attaches 
when litigation is reasonably anticipated, observing that litigation may be 
reasonably anticipated if numerous employees recognize the possibility of 
a lawsuit.70  Notably, the court acknowledged that the reasonable 
anticipation of litigation does not create an obligation to preserve all 
electronic data, noting that “[s]uch a rule would cripple large corporations 
. . . that are almost always involved in litigation.”71  In fact, the court 
stated that “a party need not preserve all back-up tapes even when it 
reasonably anticipates litigation.”72  The court did, though, make clear that 
“anyone who anticipates being a party or is a party to a lawsuit must not 
destroy unique, relevant evidence that might be useful to an adversary.”73  
The court thus held that a litigant did have the obligation to preserve any 
documents made by or for “individuals ‘likely to have discoverable 
information that the disclosing party may use to support its claims or 
defenses.’”74  These individuals, in other words, are the “key players” in 
the case.75  The court also stated that the litigant “must retain all relevant 
documents (but not multiple identical copies) in existence at the time the 
duty to preserve attaches, and any relevant documents created 
thereafter.”76 
 
[24]  Taking all of these factors into consideration, the court set forth the 
following standards for the scope of a corporation’s preservation 
obligation: “[o]nce a party reasonably anticipates litigation, it must 
                                                 
68 See, e.g., id. at 215. 
69 Id. at 219. 
70 Id. at 216–17. 
71 Id. at 217. 
72 Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. at 217. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. at 218 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(A)). 
75 Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. at 218. 
76 Id. 
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suspend its routine document retention/destruction policy and put in place 
a ‘litigation hold’ to ensure the preservation of relevant documents.”77  
The court held that this “litigation hold” did not apply to back-up tapes 
that were “inaccessible,” such as tapes that were produced for the sole 
purpose of disaster recovery (rather than information retrieval).78  The 
court held that such tapes could be recycled in the ordinary course of 
business.79  In doing so, the court created one exception to this rule, noting 
that “[i]f a company can identify where particular employee documents 
are stored on back-up tapes, then the tapes storing the documents of ‘key 
players’ to the existing or threatened litigation should be preserved if the 
information contained on those tapes is not otherwise available.”80   
 
[25]  In a subsequent opinion, the court imposed an adverse inference 
sanction due to the loss of electronic evidence that resulted from several 
communication breakdowns between counsel and its corporate client, 
counsel’s failure to accurately ascertain the corporation’s document 
management habits, and the deletion of electronic mail messages by 
several employees after being made aware of their preservation 
obligation.81  While the court ultimately determined the defendant’s 
conduct in the deletion of electronic data to be willful,82 the court 
observed that even the negligent destruction of data could result in 
sanctions (up to and including an adverse instruction sanction) so long as 
the destroyed data was relevant to the litigation.83  Ms. Zubulake 
ultimately recovered a $29.2 million jury verdict.84 
 
[26]  The Zubulake court expressed the belief that the development of 
“national standards” would place “parties and their counsel . . . fully on 
notice of their responsibility to preserve and produce electronically stored 
                                                 
77 Id. 
78 Id.  
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
81 See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, LLC, 229 F.R.D. 422, 436, 440 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) 
[hereinafter Zubulake V].  
82 Id. at 436. 
83 Id. at 431. 
84 Eduardo Porter, UBS Ordered to Pay $29 Million in Sex Bias Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 7, 2005, at C4.  
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information.”85  The Zubulake opinions represented an important step 
toward the promulgation of these “national standards,” most notably 
through their clarification of litigants’ preservation obligations with regard 
to back-up tapes, as well as their detailed explanation of the 
implementation of a “litigation hold.”86   
 
[27]  However, the Zubulake opinions left a number of important 
questions unanswered.  Most notably, the opinions failed to provide 
detailed guidance on the circumstances that should cause a party to 
reasonably anticipate litigation and place a “litigation hold” upon relevant 
documents. Rather than providing an identification and discussion of the 
types of events that should place a party upon notice of its preservation 
obligations, the Zubulake opinions appear to favor a fact-specific approach 
that offers little assistance to corporate litigants who are continually faced 
with the potential of litigation. 
 
[28]  If the Zubulake opinions can be read to provide any guidance with 
regard to this issue, they reflect an extremely broad approach to 
preservation. In Zubulake IV, the court determined that the duty to 
preserve attached in April 2001.87  The court reached this conclusion 
based upon the fact that an internal e-mail regarding the plaintiff’s 
employment was marked with a statement of attorney-client privilege88 
and based upon a statement by the plaintiff’s supervisor that the potential 
for litigation was “in the back of [his] head” by April.89  Based upon 
nothing more than these two pieces of evidence, the Zubulake court 
determined that the duty to preserve attached approximately four months 
before the litigant filed a complaint with the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission and approximately ten months before the lawsuit 
was filed.90 
 
[29]  Therefore, if the Zubulake opinions can be said to stand for any 
principle with regard to the triggering of a preservation obligation, they 
appear to suggest that such an obligation is triggered at the moment in 
                                                 
85 Zubulake V, 229 F.R.D. at 440. 
86 See, e.g., id. at 431–36. 
87 Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. at 216–17.  
88 Id.  
89 Id. at 217.  
90 See id. at 215–17.  
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which a litigant begins to consider the possibility of litigation.  Such a rule 
fails to reflect the constant threat of litigation facing corporate America. 
 
[30]  During the past ten years, the filing of putative class actions has 
more than tripled.91  These cases have provided plaintiff’s attorneys with 
ample opportunities to challenge a myriad of corporate practices and 
procedures.  The recent spate of actions filed against the insurance 
industry provides an effective example.  These actions have addressed a 
wide variety of topics such as the designation of non-original equipment 
manufacturer parts in the repair of insured vehicles,92 the contention that 
first-party automobile policyholders are entitled to compensation for post-
repair “diminished value” to the vehicles,93 the use of “direct” or 
“preferred” repair shops in the repair of insured vehicles,94 the contention 
that homeowners’ insurers are required to provide compensation for 
contractors’ “overhead and profit” (regardless of whether this amount was 
actually charged to the policyholder),95 the use of “credit scoring” in the 
review of insurance policy applications,96 and the enforcement of standard 
flood exclusions in the handling of homeowners’ claims arising from 
Hurricane Katrina and other recent storms.97  Indeed, it is difficult to think 
of an insurance claims handling practice or procedure that has not been 
challenged through litigation in recent years. 
 
[31]  Of course, challenges to corporate practices and procedures through 
the class action mechanism are not limited to the insurance industry.  One 
may only look to recent well-publicized actions concerning topics such as 
                                                 
91 John H. Beisner, Matthew Shors, & Jessica Davidson Miller, Class Action “Cops”: 
Public Servants or Private Entrepreneurs?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1441, 1445 (2005). 
92 See, e.g., Avery v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 835 N.E.2d 801 (Ill. 2005) 
(reversing a $1.18 million verdict entered on behalf of a 48-state class). 
93 See, e.g., Allgood v. Meridian Sec. Ins. Co., 836 N.E.2d 243 (Ind. 2005) (affirming 
dismissal of putative class action). 
94 See, e.g., Gaston v. Founders Ins. Co., ---N.E.2d ---, 2006 WL 618815 (Ill. App. Ct. 
Mar. 13, 2006) (affirming dismissal of the case). 
95 See, e.g., Melot v. Okla. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 87 P.3d 644 (Okla. Civ. App. Div. 
4 2003) (affirming certification of “overhead and profit” class). 
96 See, e.g., Dehoyos v. Allstate Ins. Co., 345 F.3d 290 (5th Cir. 2003) (affirming denial 
of motion to dismiss putative class action). 
97 See, e.g., Chehardy v. Wooley, No. 05-CV-01140-FJP-CN (M.D. La. filed Sept. 30, 
2005). 
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the nutritional content of fast-food cuisine98 or the purportedly deceptive 
designation of cigarettes as “light” or “low tar”99 to realize that the intent 
of many plaintiffs (or, more accurately, their attorneys) is to convert the 
slightest bit of controversy or doubt regarding corporate conduct into the 
next wave of class action litigation.  The Enron and WorldCom corporate 
scandals have helped ensure that the scrutiny of plaintiffs’ attorneys will 
not be limited to the products or services created by the entity, but will 
also extend to corporate governance practices.100 
 
[32]  Nor are broad challenges to corporate practices and procedures 
limited to putative class actions.  One of the best-known examples of such 
an approach was seen in the landmark United States Supreme Court 
decision of State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell.101 
In this case, a plaintiff obtained a $145 million punitive damages award in 
an insurance bad faith case, which was based in part upon evidence of the 
defendant insurer’s claims handling practices, many of which had no 
relevance to the instant case.102  In vacating the punitive damages verdict, 
the Court held that a “defendant’s dissimilar acts, independent from the 
acts upon which liability was premised, may not serve as the basis for 
punitive damages.”103  The Court did nonetheless indicate that an award of 
punitive damages could be based in part upon evidence of “prior 
transgressions” that replicate the conduct at issue, or other past conduct 
that has a connection to the harm purportedly suffered by the plaintiff.104  
Thus, while Campbell placed significant limits upon the ability to utilize 
an individual action as a quasi-referendum upon a corporation’s general 
practices and procedures, litigants remain free to utilize an individual 
claim as a springboard to a general attack upon a particular corporate 
policy or procedure that is alleged to have occurred in the instant case. 
                                                 
98 See, e.g., Pelman ex rel. Pelman v. McDonald’s Corp., 396 F.3d 508 (2d Cir. 2005) 
(applying New York law and reversing in part dismissal of putative class action by trial 
court). 
99 See, e.g., Price v. Philip Morris, Inc., No. 96326, 2005 WL 3434368 (Ill. Dec. 15, 
2005) (reversing $10.1 billion verdict entered on behalf of national class).   
100 See generally Dana M. Muir & Cindy M. Schiapani, New Standards of Director 
Loyalty and Care in the Post-Enron Era: Are Some Shareholders More Equal than 
Others?, 8 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 279 (2004–05).  
101 State Farm Mut. Auto. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003). 
102 Id. at 415, 420. 
103 Id. at 422. 
104 Id. at 423. 
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[33]  Where does all of this leave a potential corporate defendant?  As 
commentators have observed, a company of any reasonable size is faced 
with a continuous barrage of lawsuits, all of which taken together may 
substantially magnify preservation obligations that appear reasonable 
when applied on a case-by-case basis.105  These obligations become even 
greater given case law suggesting that parties may be required to 
implement a “litigation hold” on the mere suspicion of litigation.106  In an 
era in which plaintiff’s attorneys are continually searching for the next 
corporate practice upon which to base a wave of litigation, sophisticated 
corporations may be aware of numerous policies, procedures, or other 
courses of conduct that could become the subject of future litigation, 
whether justified or not.  Under the Zubulake approach, these corporations 
would arguably be required to preserve every scrap of “active” electronic 
data pertaining to these courses of conduct from the time of 
implementation.107  This duty would attach regardless of whether the 
corporation had the good faith belief that the course of conduct in question 
was in full compliance with the law.  At minimum, this duty would remain 
until the termination of the course of conduct, and possibly until the 
expiration of any limitations period pertaining to a cause of action.  Based 
upon this formula, it is reasonable to foresee a “litigation hold” for some 
corporate defendants in perpetuity.108  As such, court imposed 
preservation obligations could prove to be enormous. 
 
[34]  For example, a manufacturer of products arguably prone to product 
liability litigation may be required to preserve all “active” data pertaining 
to the design of the product, including countless internal E-mails, 
memoranda and data compilations reflecting every step of the design 
process.109  Given the post-Enron scrutiny of corporate governance 
practices, any large public company could conceivably be required to 
preserve all “active” electronic data pertaining to the process of internal 
                                                 
105 See Andrew M. Scherffius, Thomas Y. Allman, Stephen G. Morrison, Laura Lewis 
Owens, & Anthony Tarricone, Panel Four: Rule 37 and/or a New Rule 34.1: Safe 
Harbors for E-Document Preservation and Sanctions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 71, 79 
(2004). 
106 Zubulake V, 229 F.R.D. at 431. 
107 Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, 217 F.R.D. 309, 318 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) [hereinafter 
Zubulake I]. 
108 Zubulake V, 229 F.R.D. at 431. 
109 Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 318. 
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decision making, on the grounds that any such entity could reasonably 
expect litigation in this area.110 
 
[35]  The Zubulake court recognized the risk that a rule requiring the 
preservation of all forms of electronic data “would cripple large 
corporations . . . that are almost always involved in litigation.”111  While 
the Zubulake court’s proposed solution of limiting the duty to preserve 
“inaccessible” electronic data112 is certainly better than nothing, it fails to 
address the seemingly limitless obligation to preserve “active” data.  As 
long as Zubulake retains its perception in the legal community as the 
leading standard for the spoliation of electronic discovery,113 cautious 
corporations may have little choice but to preserve vast amounts of 
electronic data for years to come. 
 
[36]  In the less than two years since the release of Zubulake IV, numerous 
courts have adopted its recognition of a litigant’s duty to impose a 
“litigation hold” to prevent the deletion of relevant electronic data.114  
However, the decisions in the months following Zubulake have been less 
than consistent in determining precisely when the preservation obligation 
attaches.  Some courts have taken a narrower approach to this question 
than the Zubulake court took.  For example, in Treppel v. Biovail Corp.,115 
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York 
held that a party’s preservation obligations attached when the party 
became aware of the filing of a complaint, while noting that “the mere 
existence of a dispute between Mr. Treppel and Biovail in early 2002 did 
                                                 
110 Id. 
111 Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. at 217. 
112 Id. 
113 See Sharon D. Nelson & John W. Simek, Spoliation of Electronic Evidence: This Way 
Be Dragons, 68 TEX. B.J. 478, 478 (2005) (noting that the effects of the Zubulake 
spoliation decisions “have rippled through the legal profession”).  
114 See, e.g., MOSAID, 348 F. Supp. at 339 (holding that “[w]hen the duty to preserve is 
triggered, it cannot be a defense to a spoliation claim that the party inadvertently failed to 
place a ‘litigation hold’ or ‘off switch’ on its document retention policy to stop the 
destruction of [potentially relevant] evidence”); see also Pelman, 396 F.3d at 508; 
Campbell, 538 U.S. at 408. 
115 233 F.R.D. 363 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
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not mean that the parties should reasonably have anticipated litigation at 
that time and taken steps to preserve evidence.”116 
 
[37]  Other courts have taken a broader approach to preservation that is 
similar to that of the Zubulake court.  For example, in Broccoli v. Echostar 
Communications Corp., the United States District Court for the District of 
Maryland held that a corporate defendant’s preservation obligation in a 
sexual harassment matter attached when the plaintiff employee began to 
complain of the harassment to his supervisors: nearly 11 months before 
the plaintiff was fired from the company and 14 months before the 
plaintiff filed a complaint with the EEOC.117  Furthermore, citing the 
defendant’s “status as a large public corporation with ample financial 
resources and personnel management know-how,” the court concluded 
that the defendant “clearly acted in bad faith in its failure to suspend its 
email and data destruction policy or preserve essential personnel 
documents in order to fulfill its duty to preserve the relevant 
documentation for purposes of potential litigation.”118 
 
[38]  Some courts have attempted to mitigate the impact of broad 
electronic discovery preservation obligations by conditioning the 
standards for spoliation sanctions upon the time of destruction.  For 
example, in E*Trade Securities LLC v. Deutsche Bank AG, the United 
States District Court for the District of Minnesota held that “[t]he 
obligation to preserve evidence begins when a party knows or should have 
known that the evidence is relevant to future or current litigation.”119  
However, the court also stated that “[i]f destruction of relevant 
information occurs before any litigation has begun,” spoliation sanctions 
would be conditioned upon a showing of bad faith.120  Although the court 
indicated that “[b]ad faith need not directly be shown but can be implied 
by the party’s behavior,”121 the court did not follow some of the decisions 
                                                 
116 Id. at 371; see also Convolve, Inc. v. Compaq Computer Corp., 223 F.R.D. 162, 176 
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (implicitly recognizing that preservation obligation attaches upon filing 
of complaint). 
117 229 F.R.D. 506, 510–11 (D. Md. 2005). 
118 Id. at 512. 
119 230 F.R.D. 582, 588 (D. Minn. 2005) (citing Stevenson v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 354 
F.3d 739, 746 (8th Cir. 2004)). 
120 Id. 
121 Id. 
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set forth above suggesting that the mere failure to implement a “litigation 
hold” at the slightest threat of litigation would be indicative of bad faith.  
Rather, the court observed that, in order to determine whether sanctions 
are warranted for the loss of evidence due to the operation of a document 
retention system prior to litigation, courts must examine “‘(1) whether the 
retention policy is reasonable considering the facts and circumstances 
surrounding those documents, (2) whether lawsuits or complaints have 
been filed frequently concerning the type of records at issue, and (3) 
whether the document retention policy was instituted in bad faith.’”122  
However, the court cautioned that, if “the destruction of evidence occurs 
after litigation is imminent or has begun, no bad faith need be shown by 
the moving party” to justify spoliation sanctions, as “‘a corporation cannot 
blindly destroy documents and expect to be shielded by a seemingly 
innocuous document retention policy.’”123 
 
[39]  At the present time, no court appears to have held that a duty to 
preserve documents attaches upon the reasonable belief within a 
corporation that a corporate practice or procedure may one day become 
the subject of litigation.  However, for the reasons set forth above, such a 
holding may be the inevitable result of Zubulake and its progeny.  Even if 
such a broad interpretation of a corporation’s electronic discovery 
preservation obligations is never accepted by a jurisdiction, the mere 
threat of such a decision may be enough to compel many corporations to 
undertake the significant burden and expense of retaining vast amounts of 
electronic data for indeterminate periods of time.  Such a result is only 
encouraged by the increasing tendency of many courts (as reflected above) 
to impose significant sanctions for the spoliation of electronic evidence 
without regard to the intent of the litigants in destroying the evidence.  It is 
understandable that a potential litigant would err on the side of extreme 
caution in a climate where a defense strategy may be severely hampered, 
if not undone, by a simple judgment call with regard to the preservation of 
discovery. 
 
[40]  The problems resulting from the recognition of overbroad 
preservation obligations in Zubulake and its progeny were foreshadowed 
in a prescient article prepared by Professor Martin Redish before most of 
                                                 
122 Id. at 588–89 (quoting Stevenson, 354 F.3d at 747–48). 
123 Id. at 589 (quoting Stevenson, 354 F.3d at 749). 
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the above opinions were issued.124  Professor Redish observed that “[a]t 
some point, society must be willing to cut back on the search for truth to 
take account of other values the litigation matrix serves, including the 
utilitarian concern for efficiency, the need to preserve the procedural-
substantive balance, and the need to provide predictable standards of 
primary behavior.”125  Professor Redish noted that “[a]n absolute strict 
liability retention standard” for electronic discovery that is “triggered by 
the mere potential of suit” would “severely threaten attainment of all three 
goals” by requiring “commercial enterprises that face the constant threat 
of litigation” to “constantly review its back-up tapes for documents that 
could, at some later point in the litigation process, be deemed relevant,” 
with the threat of sanctions if these enterprises “predicted incorrectly.”126  
As Professor Redish commented, 
 
[t]he only realistic alternative to such a burden would be a 
policy of total retention indefinitely – a practice that, given 
the geometric increases in document volume in the 
electronic age, could lead to the physical overrunning of a 
company with electronic equipment and severe retrieval 
burdens if and when the documents actually were needed in 
litigation.127 
 
[41]  Since Professor Redish’s article, Zubulake and other decisions have 
placed reasonable limits upon the duty to preserve back-up tapes or other 
forms of “inaccessible” media.128  However, this provides little comfort in 
light of the adoption of preservation standards in Zubulake and other cases 
that approach the “strict liability” standard foreshadowed by Professor 
Redish.  The promulgation of such broad preservation standards 
demonstrates the reasons for which serious consideration must be given to 
Professor Redish’s call to “[reconsider] spoliation standards in light of the 
modern technology of electronic storage.”129 
 
                                                 
124 Martin H. Redish, Electronic Discovery and the Litigation Matrix, 51 DUKE L.J. 561 
(2001). 
125 Id. at 623. 
126 Id.  
127 Id.  
128 Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. at 218; see also Thompson, 219 F.R.D. at 100. 
129 Redish, supra note 124, at 623. 
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[42]  As noted at the outset of this article, the Judicial Conference of the 
United States has responded to these concerns by recommending that the 
United States Supreme Court adopt amendments to the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure regarding electronic discovery, including preservation 
obligations.130  The Court approved these amendments in April 2006, who 
then forwarded the amendments to the United States Congress.131  Unless 
Congress takes the highly unlikely step of enacting legislation to modify 
or nullify these amendments, they will take effect on December 1, 2006.132  
The following section of this Article provides a summary and analysis of 
pertinent amendments and demonstrates the reasons for which these 
amendments, although well-intentioned, fail to fully address the 
preservation problem. 
 
III.  THE ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES 
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: A NEW REVOLUTION OR MORE OF THE SAME? 
 
[43]  The proposed amendments represent a wide-ranging effort to 
conform the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to the digital age.  For 
example, the proposed amendment to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
26(b)(2)(B) expressly provides that absent a showing of good cause, “[a] 
party need not provide discovery of electronically stored information from 
sources that the party identifies as not reasonably accessible because of 
undue burden or cost.”133  Furthermore, in order to address the enhanced 
risk of the inadvertent inclusion of privileged material in the production of 
voluminous amounts of electronic discovery, a proposed amendment to 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(5)(B) establishes a procedure for 
the post-production assertion of privilege.134 
 
[44]  Two of the proposed amendments specifically deal with electronic 
discovery preservation requirements.  First, a proposed amendment to 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(f) expressly provides that the pre-trial 
discovery conference mandated by the current form of the rule should 
incorporate a discussion of “any issues relating to disclosure or discovery 
                                                 
130 See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 2. 
131 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2074–75 (2004) (describing process for enactment of revisions to the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).  
132 See id. 
133 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 2, at C-51–52. 
134 See id. at C-62.  
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of electronically stored information, including the form or forms in which 
it should be produced.”135  The amendment also requires parties to 
“discuss any issues relating to preserving discoverable information” 
during the course of the conference.136 
 
[45]  If enacted, this proposed amendment will go a long way toward 
minimizing the potential of spoliation disputes resulting from the deletion 
of electronically stored material after a lawsuit has been filed.  By 
requiring parties to discuss the preservation of both electronic and non-
electronic materials at the outset of litigation, the amendment should help 
to ensure that all parties are on notice as to the precise scope of their 
preservation obligations.  It may also encourage the parties to strike 
reasonable compromises with regard to these obligations, in accord with 
the proposed Committee Note’s statement that “[t]he parties’ discussion 
should pay particular attention to the balance between the competing 
needs to preserve relevant evidence and to continue routine operations 
critical to ongoing activities.”137 
 
[46]  However, this amendment does little to avoid spoliation disputes that 
may arise from the pre-complaint destruction of evidence.  Indeed, by 
alerting parties to spoliation issues at the outset of litigation, the 
amendment could encourage some litigants to seek sanctions for the pre-
complaint spoliation of electronic evidence. 
 
[47]  The second, and most significant, revision to the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure pertaining to preservation obligations will establish a new 
rule codified as Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(f).  This rule will 
provide that “[a]bsent exceptional circumstances, a court may not impose 
sanctions under these rules on a party for failing to provide electronically 
stored information lost as a result of the routine, good-faith operation of an 
electronic information system.”138 
 
[48]  At first glance, this rule would appear to resolve many of the 
problems set forth above.  By offering protection from sanctions for the 
                                                 
135 Id. at C-39.  
136 Id. at C-38. 
137 Id. at C-34. 
138 Id. at C-86. 
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loss of data due to the good faith operation of a computer system, the rule 
suggests that sanctions should only be imposed for the willful or wanton 
destruction of electronic discovery.  However, the Committee Note 
indicates that the new rule does not extend nearly as far.  Rather, the Note 
states that “[g]ood faith in the routine operation of an information system 
may involve a party’s intervention to modify or suspend certain features of 
that routine operation to prevent the loss of information, if that 
information is subject to a preservation obligation.”139  The Note further 
indicates that “[a] preservation obligation may arise from many sources, 
including common law, statutes, regulations, or a court order in the 
case.”140  Indeed, the Note expressly states that a duty to preserve 
requiring the implementation of a “litigation hold” may attach “because of 
pending or reasonably anticipated litigation.”141  The Note does not limit 
the potential duty to implement a “litigation hold” to “accessible” data.  It 
indicates that “depend[ing] upon the circumstances of each case,” a party 
may be required to preserve inaccessible data (such as back-up tapes), 
particularly if “the information on such sources is likely to be discoverable 
and not available from reasonably accessible sources.”142 
 
[49]  While seemingly an important step in the ongoing effort to reflect the 
impact of electronic discovery upon a litigant’s preservation obligations, 
proposed Rule 37(f) will have little, if any, practical impact upon these 
obligations.  The Committee Note makes it clear that the extent of a 
party’s preservation obligations with regard to electronic discovery will 
remain dependent upon pre-existing common law.  Therefore, the 
proposed Rule will continue to provide courts with significant discretion 
in which to make after-the-fact determinations of when a party was 
required to place a “litigation hold” on the destruction of electronic 
discovery.  The Committee Note also makes clear that courts will continue 
to have significant discretion to impose sanctions for a “wrong guess” as 
to the precise moment when a litigation hold should be implemented.  
Indeed, the proposed Rule appears to accomplish little more than 
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authorizing the general use of electronic document retention systems: a 
point that has never been seriously challenged by any jurisdiction.143 
 
[50]  Therefore, proposed Rule 37(f), while well-intentioned, fails to 
accomplish its apparent goal of ensuring that preservation obligations 
address the unique aspects of electronic discovery.  Indeed, with regard to 
the preservation of “inaccessible” electronic data, proposed Rule 37(f) 
arguably represents a step backward.  As noted above, the Zubulake court 
placed strict limitations on a litigant’s duty to preserve inaccessible data, 
holding that this duty extended only to the preservation of back-up tapes 
of “key players” containing data that was otherwise unavailable.144  The 
Zubulake court therefore indicated that the destruction of “inaccessible” 
data in the ordinary course of business will only warrant sanctions if the 
data is both unavailable from other sources and highly relevant.  As set 
forth in the Committee Note, proposed Rule 37(f) appears to broaden this 
standard to require the preservation of “inaccessible” data that is merely 
discoverable, so long as the data is unavailable from other sources.  In so 
doing, the Rule suggests a return to the pre-Zubulake era, in which a 
number of courts recognized a broad duty to preserve back-up tapes.145 
 
[51]  By failing to provide guidance as to the precise extent of a litigant’s 
preservation obligations, proposed Rule 37(f) does little to re-assure 
litigants who now see little choice but to preserve vast quantities of 
information on the mere suspicion that it may become relevant in future 
litigation.  Given the current interest in re-examining the impact of the 
electronic age upon traditional principles of discovery, now is the time to 
promulgate a rule that will provide clear and unambiguous standards with 
regard to the preservation obligation. 
 
IV.  CLARIFYING THE ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY PRESERVATION OBLIGATION 
 
[53]  Throughout the process of developing the proposed electronic 
discovery amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, many 
commentators have offered a variety of suggestions in order to mitigate 
                                                 
143 See Arthur Andersen, 125 S.Ct. 2129, 2135 (recognizing the permissibility of 
document retention systems). 
144 Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. at 218.  
145 See Linnen, 1999 WL 462015, at *6; Wiginton, 2003 WL 22439865, at *6. 
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the risk of spoliation sanctions from the ordinary maintenance of 
document retention systems.  A number of legal commentators have 
suggested that the Rules should contain express language providing that 
“parties should not be required to suspend the normal operation of 
reasonable document destruction without prior court orders.”146  However, 
the Civil Rules Advisory Committee has acknowledged concerns that 
making specific reference to court orders in the context of an electronic 
discovery preservation rule “would promote applications for preservation 
orders as a way to defeat application of the proposed rule.”147 
 
[54]  Others have suggested conditioning electronic discovery spoliation 
sanctions upon intentional or reckless conduct.148  In responding to this 
suggestion, the Advisory Committee reflected concerns that proof that “a 
litigant acted intentionally or recklessly in permitting the regular operation 
of an information system to continue might prove quite difficult and 
require discovery and fact-finding that could involve inquiry into difficult 
subjective issues,” and may also “insulate conduct that should be subject 
to sanctions.”149 
 
[55]  Regardless of what one may think of these concerns, it remains clear 
that the proposed amendments fail to provide litigants with the necessary 
guidance concerning the precise extent of electronic discovery 
preservation obligations.  One potential way of providing such notice is to 
incorporate (either in the Committee Note or the Rule itself) fair and 
equitable bright-line standards for the preservation of electronic discovery.  
These standards should establish that a party is under no obligation to 
place a “litigation hold” upon electronic discovery (or discovery in 
general) unless, and until, the party has been placed on actual notice of a 
litigant’s intention to file suit, or actual notice of any legal challenge to the 
conduct at issue in the litigation. 
 
[56]  The Committee Note should provide examples of the type of conduct 
that would ordinarily be deemed to place a party on such notice.  Of 
                                                 
146 E.g., Thomas Y. Allman, The Need for Federal Standards Regarding Electronic 
Discovery, 68 DEF. COUNS. J. 206, 209 (2001). 
147 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 2, at C-84. 
148 See id. 
149 Id. 
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course, the filing of a complaint itself is clearly sufficient notice that 
should invoke a “litigation hold.”  Notice could also be established by a 
written or oral statement from the litigant, or his or her counsel, stating an 
intention to file suit in the near future.  Furthermore, notice could be 
established by the commencement of an investigation by a regulatory 
authority with regard to the conduct at issue. 
 
[57]  It is important to recognize that the adoption of these standards 
would not represent a sea change with regard to the law of electronic 
discovery spoliation.  Indeed, the vast majority of reported decisions in 
which sanctions have been imposed concern the destruction of electronic 
evidence after a complaint has been filed.  Therefore, the adoption of 
bright-line standards would not significantly conflict with current case 
law, but would simply guard against the risk of judicial over-reaching.  By 
eliminating this risk, the adoption of these standards would provide 
litigants with the genuine assurance that the good faith operation of 
routine data retention systems will not lead to unexpected sanctions. 
 
[58]  The adoption of these standards would admittedly create a small risk 
that litigants would engage in “file cleansing” to eliminate evidence of 
wrongful conduct on the suspicion of future litigation.  To guard against 
this potential problem, any attempt to promulgate bright-line standards for 
the preservation of electronic discovery should also indicate that 
regardless of these standards, any intentional destruction of electronic data 
for the purpose of concealing evidence in future litigation may warrant 
spoliation sanctions.  The Committee Note could explain that such a 
standard may be satisfied by the creation of a document storage system 
that is calculated to minimize the discovery of potentially harmful 
electronic discovery.  For example, a litigant may be sanctioned for the 
implementation of a document storage system that automatically deletes 
files containing certain words and phrases,150 or the implementation of a 
data storage system that erases electronic data after an unreasonably short 
period of time. 
 
[59]  Although any investigation of the intentional nature of file deletion 
may necessarily require discovery and fact-finding, this should not be a 
                                                 
150 See Daniel B. Garrie et al., Comment, Hiding the Inaccessible Truth: Amending the 
Federal Rules to Accommodate Electronic Discovery, 25 REV. LITIG. 115, 128 (2006). 
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major concern given the rare nature of such conduct.  Indeed, those legal 
commentators who have raised concerns regarding the need for discovery 
in determining the intentional nature of a litigant’s conduct overlook the 
fact that in most matters concerning spoliation of electronic discovery, 
extensive discovery will be necessary to determine the extent of a 
litigant’s compliance with a “litigation hold.” 
 
[60]  Finally, any amendment to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37 
should place strict limitations on preservation obligations for 
“inaccessible” electronic data.  This could be accomplished by revising the 
Committee Note to proposed Rule 37(f) to provide that even if 
discoverable material contained on “inaccessible” media is not available 
on “active” electronic media, litigants are under no duty to place a 
litigation hold on such media unless it contains information directly 
relevant to the claims or defenses at issue. 
 
[61]  The adoption of these standards would strike a necessary balance 
between the need to preserve relevant electronic evidence and the burden 
and expense of complying with seemingly endless preservation 
obligations.  In so doing, these revisions to proposed Rule 37(f) would 
help ensure that the Rule more fully serves its intended purpose of 
providing a “safe harbor” for the routine operation of electronic 
information systems. 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
[62]  Although the electronic discovery amendments to the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure are almost certain to be enacted as written, the Judicial 
Conference has never been hesitant to modify rules that have been proven 
unworkable.151  The years following the implementation of the 
amendments will determine the ultimate outcome of these provisions.  If 
courts apply the amended version of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37 in 
a fair and equitable manner to create a true “safe harbor” for the routine 
operation of electronic data retention systems, no further revisions may be 
necessary.  However, if courts interpret preservation obligations so 
broadly as to overwhelm the purpose of the Rule, the Judicial Conference 
                                                 
151 See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (Committee Note to 1993 amendment) (discussing the need to 
revise the amendment to address perceived inadequacies). 
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is likely to act swiftly to correct these problems.  By doing so, the 
Conference will ensure that the amended rule forwards the central goal of 
adopting longstanding principles of discovery to the electronic age. 
